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POWERFUL SPEAKERS AND
THEIR LISTENERS
HELEN NORTON*
Sometimes speakers prefer to tell lies when their listeners
thirst for the truth: think of a huckster who falsely claims to
potential buyers that his jalopy gets forty miles to the gallon.
Listeners may hope that speakers will reveal their secrets
while those speakers at times resist disclosure—consider here
the worker who wonders what her co-workers are paid while
her employer jealously guards that information. And at still
other times, speakers seek to address certain listeners when
those listeners long to be left alone, as anyone on the wrong
end of a telemarketer’s call can attest. When speakers’ and
listeners’ First Amendment interests collide, whose interests
should prevail? 1
Law sometimes—but not always—puts listeners’ interests
first in settings where those listeners have less information or
power than speakers. This “listener-centered” approach understands the First Amendment to permit the government to regulate the speech of comparatively knowledgeable or powerful
speakers when that expression frustrates their listeners’ auton* Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law, University of
Colorado School of Law. Thanks to Jessica Reed-Baum and Jonathan Smith for
outstanding research assistance; to Margot Kaminski, Craig Konnoth, Scott
Skinner-Thompson, Blake Reid, and the participants at the 2018 Rothgerber
Constitutional Law Conference on “Listeners and the First Amendment” for their
thoughtful comments; and to the University of Colorado Law Review for excellent
editorial support.
1. See OWEN FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996) (observing that some
free speech theories are “unable to explain why the interests of speakers should
take priority over the interests of those individuals who are discussed in the
speech, or who must listen to the speech, when those two sets of interests
conflict”); Leslie Kendrick, Are Speech Rights for Speakers?, 103 VA. L. REV. 1767,
1798 (2017) (“Recognizing both speakers’ and listeners’ rights makes cases more
complex and possibly creates divergent outcomes.”). And while listeners seek
liberty from deception or coercion by comparatively powerful speakers, powerful
speakers in turn may seek liberty from the government’s interference with their
expressive choices. See GRANT MC CONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 194 (1966) (explaining that freedom from regulation by the
government “may enlarge the freedom of the powerful, but it may also diminish
the freedom of the weak”).
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omy, enlightenment, and self-governance interests—values at
the heart of the Free Speech Clause.2 Under a listener-centered
approach, the government can, for instance, prohibit those
speakers from lying to their listeners or from accosting their
listeners with unwelcome speech, even when the speakers
would prefer otherwise.
Why put listeners’ interests first in these relationships of
expressive inequality? 3 When speakers enjoy advantages of
information or power over their listeners, their speech can
more readily harm their listeners through deception or
coercion. In other words, they can mislead or muscle their
listeners in ways that strike us as unfair and sometimes
dangerous. A speaker engages in deception when she tries to
make her listener believe x when she knows that x is not true.
A speaker can seek to deceive her listener through lies and
material omissions: the less access to information the listener
has, the more difficult to identify and counter the speaker’s
efforts to deceive. In contrast, a speaker engages in coercion
when he uses or threatens force or power to pressure his
listener to choose y when the listener might otherwise choose z.
Examples of coercion include a speaker’s threats to punish his
listeners’ resistance to his message—threats that become more
credible when the speaker holds physical, economic, or legal
power over his listeners. A speaker can also coerce his listeners
by hectoring them while “captive” until they abandon their

2. ROBERT POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 6 (2012) (explaining the
three major purposes of the First Amendment as furthering individual autonomy
and self-fulfillment, advancing knowledge and discovering truth, and facilitating
democratic self-governance).
3. I discussed the value of a listener-centered approach to certain First
Amendment problems in earlier work. See Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the
Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31
(2016) [hereinafter Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace] (proposing a
listener-centered approach to employers’ speech to workers); Helen Norton,
Secrets, Lies, and Disclosures, 27 J.L. & POL. 641 (2012) (proposing a listenercentered approach to disclosure law); see also Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton,
Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights for Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169
(2016) (suggesting the value of a listener-centered approach to the free speech
problems posed by the speech of artificial intelligence). This work in turn built on
that of the many thoughtful commentators who have considered related issues.
E.g., Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999); Burt
Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets,
55 BROOK. L. REV. 5 (1989).
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opposition to his message. A speaker can sometimes both
deceive and coerce his listeners—for instance, by lying to them
when they are captive or otherwise subject to his control.
When we take the side of listeners in these relationships—
that is, when we require more of speakers when their listeners
lack information or power—we improve the quality of the communicative discourse. More specifically, we promote listeners’
First Amendment interests when we enable them to receive accurate information that informs, but does not coerce, their decision-making. We also achieve related moral goals: in Kantian
terms, we recognize listeners as ends in themselves rather than
as mere means through which powerful speakers seek to
achieve their own ends.4
In this Essay, I explore and defend listener-centered
approaches to a variety of First Amendment problems. In Part
I, I identify the dynamics of certain environments in which
speakers’ and listeners’ First Amendment interests collide.
More specifically, I list a number of ways in which speakers
sometimes enjoy advantages of information or power (or both)
over their listeners, thus enhancing their ability to deceive or
coerce those listeners. In Part II, I describe how law can
address these inequalities. In particular, law can forbid comparatively knowledgeable or powerful speakers from lying to
their listeners, it can require those speakers to make truthful
disclosures to their listeners, and it can bar those speakers (as
well as the government) from coercing their listeners. I then
consider how these approaches do, or could, work in various
speaker-listener relationships. First Amendment law sometimes takes a listener-centered approach; this has been the
case, as we’ll see, in commercial and professional speech
4. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63–
65 (James W. Ellington trans., 3d ed. 1993) (1785) (explaining that lies are
morally wrong when speakers undermine listener autonomy by seeking to use
their listeners as a means to the speakers’ own ends, rather than treating
listeners as ends in themselves); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH &
TRUTHFULNESS 117 (2002) (“[W]e want to believe that what people deserve or are
owed is determined not by considerations of social positions but, at the most basic
levels of morality from a position of equality.”). We can also advance related
instrumental goals when we empower comparatively disadvantaged listeners. See
ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 286 (1991) (“[L]aws that serve to
distribute power more broadly and equally are likely to bolster informal-control
systems. For example, when lawmakers succeed in equalizing power within
relationships such as landlord-tenant and husband-wife, they make it easier for
those involved to work out problems informally.”).
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settings. I suggest that we should extend a listener-centered
approach to other communicative relationships of inequality:
employers’ speech to workers about the terms and conditions of
employment, and service providers’ speech to women seeking
reproductive health care. In Part III, I flag some questions and
challenges for further discussion. Although a listener-centered
approach doesn’t solve all free speech problems, it offers a
valuable perspective for thinking about some of them—and, in
so doing, it forces us to think hard about whether and when
law and policy should respond to expressive inequalities.
I.

INEQUALITIES OF INFORMATION AND POWER

First Amendment theory and doctrine generally presume
that “public discourse”—the universe of speech key to democratic self-governance and thus the most rigorously protected
from government regulation—occurs in a relationship of equality in which we celebrate (and thus privilege) speakers’ autonomy interest in saying what they want to say.5 But, as Robert
Post explains, expressive settings outside of public discourse
may involve inequalities between speakers and listeners that
invite, if not require, an emphasis on listeners’ interests:
Whereas within public discourse the political imperatives of
democracy require that persons be regarded as equal and as
autonomous, outside public discourse the law commonly
regards persons as dependent, vulnerable, and hence unequal. Clients are legally entitled to rely on the advice of
their lawyers, consumers on the representations of manufacturers, shareholders on the information of corporations.
That is why law holds lawyers accountable for malpractice,
manufacturers for the failure to warn, and corporations for
misrepresentation. Within public discourse, by contrast, the
5. See POST, supra note 2, at 21 (“Within public discourse, the First
Amendment protects the autonomy of speakers, not merely the rights of
audiences. If persons within public discourse are prevented from choosing what to
communicate or not to communicate, the value of democratic legitimation will not
be served. Persons will not experience participation in public discourse as a means
of making government responsive to their own personal views.”); Jack M. Balkin,
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1185,
1214 (2016) (“[W]hat falls within public discourse and what falls outside of it does
not depend on the content of the speech. Rather, it depends on a characterization
of social relationships.”).
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First Amendment ascribes autonomy equally to speakers
and to their audience, so that the rule of caveat emptor
applies. This contrast is quite stark, and it is the single
most salient pattern of entrenched First Amendment
doctrine. 6

In this Essay, I focus on a variety of situations outside of
public discourse in which speakers enjoy advantages of information or power (or both) over their listeners in ways threatening to listeners’ interests in self-realization, enlightenment,
and democratic self-governance. 7

6. POST, supra note 2, at 23; see also Balkin, supra note 5, at 1215 (“But
when people engage in speech that is not characterized as part of public discourse,
the First Amendment treats their behavior quite differently. Outside of the realm
of public discourse, the law drops its assumption that everyone is equally able,
independent, and knowledgeable, and that everyone can equally fend for
themselves.”). For this reason, the majority in Citizens United v. FEC was
describing its doctrine specifically in the realm of public discourse when it
asserted that “the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of
political speech based on the speaker’s identity.” 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010). In
other settings, courts have long treated certain speakers differently based on their
expression’s differing potential for value and for harm; examples include not only
commercial and professional speakers, but also students, prisoners, and public
employees. See id. at 393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. I put aside for now longstanding and important debates over whether the
equality of speakers and listeners within public discourse is more presumed than
realized. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124
HARV. L. REV. 143, 155–58 (2010) (explaining that the majority and the dissent in
Citizens United agreed that political expression’s primary First Amendment value
is to inform listeners as voters, but that they disagreed over the question whether
unfettered corporate political speech is valuable or instead dangerous to such
listeners). To be sure, some argue that we can and should require more of
powerful speakers even in public discourse. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 133 (1996) (“To the extent that
political struggle takes place on the basis of deliberation rather than of power, it
is more evenly matched. The deliberative playing field is more nearly level. Moral
appeals are the weapon of the weak—not the only weapon, to be sure, but one that
by its nature gives them an advantage over the powerful.”); RON LEVY & GRAEME
ORR, THE LAW OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 101 (2016) (“Informed deliberation
in politics, being a collective and shared activity, is surely no less important than
informed deliberation over consumption. . . . [T]he more that politics is practised
via sophisticated marketing techniques, the more we might want to subject it to
ethical standards similar to those of corporate speech.”); BURT NEUBORNE,
MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 117 (2015) (urging a
“hearer-centered” approach to corporate speech that would include “limits on the
corporate electoral speech that currently forces hearers to absorb massive
amounts of corporate propaganda that they do not wish to hear”).
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Inequalities of Information

Some speakers benefit from what Kim Lane Scheppele
calls “[s]tructurally unequal access to information,” which “occurs when one actor can obtain information more easily than
another actor can—and can do so because she holds some special position that provides a shortcut, as it were, to find out the
information.” 8 Speakers enjoy informational advantages over
their listeners for various reasons: for example, when speakers
themselves produce information, when speakers acquire information through specialized training or experience, or when the
law empowers speakers to hold monopoly or near-monopoly
control of information. The less access to information the listener has in these relationships, the more difficult to identify
and counter a speaker’s efforts to deceive.
1. Information Created by the Speaker
Sometimes speakers possess more information than their
listeners because they generate (and keep) key information
themselves. Think of commercial actors’ speech to consumers:
commercial actors know more than anyone else about the products and services they offer for others to buy. They know more
about their benefits and advantages; they also know more
about their limitations, shortcomings, and even dangers. 9
8. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
COMMON LAW 120 (1988); see also id. at 121 (“In addition, the two actors may not
be equally capable of making the effort required to find the information. This unequal capacity can occur because one actor (1) does not even know that the
knowledge exists to be sought out while the other does (the problem of deep
secrets), (2) has fewer resources—and so cannot invest what it takes to acquire
the information while the other can (the problem of economic inequality), or (3)
has less intellectual ability or social experience to begin with and so is unequally
matched with more savvy partners (the problem of unequal facility).”). Elsewhere
I have discussed Professor Scheppele’s work to describe how employers and
workers have structurally unequal access to knowledge about the terms and
conditions of employment in ways that justify imposing duties of honesty and
accuracy upon employers’ speech to workers. Helen Norton, Employers’ Duties of
Honesty and Accuracy, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 575, 578 (2017).
9. Contract and commercial law often regulate speech to address these sorts
of asymmetries between transactional parties; examples include the doctrines of
unconscionability and adhesion. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of
Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 150 (2005) (explaining how contract
law corrects for inequality in parties’ bargaining power); Andrew Tutt,
Commoditized Speech, “Bargain Fairness,” and the First Amendment, 2017 BYU
L. REV. 117, 149 (2017) (describing contract law’s content-based regulation of
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2. Information Acquired by the Speaker’s Training or
Experience
Sometimes speakers know more than their listeners because of their greater training or expertise. Illustrations here
include medical, legal, and other experts’ speech to their patients or clients about the options available for treating a
health condition or resolving a legal dispute, as well as those
options’ potential risks and rewards. 10 Relatedly, sometimes
speakers acquire more experience with, and thus perhaps sophistication about, certain matters or processes. 11 For instance,
because an employer with many employees over a long period
of time must repeatedly navigate the substance as well as the
process of employment law, she frequently possesses more
knowledge about workplace law than does an individual
worker. 12

transactional speech as seeking “to level the bargaining positions of the parties
and thereby help individuals to obtain a better deal in circumstances of significant
information asymmetry”); see also CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 34 (1993) (“We might conclude that the New Dealers
were trying to regulate speech in order to protect the deliberative autonomy of
everyone involved. They sought to do this by limiting certain forms of coercion and
deception that had otherwise been made possible by law. Restrictions on the
sharp or coercive practices of people who sell securities, food and drugs, or who
manage broadcasting stations, might well promote the system of free
expression.”).
10. See Claudia Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1271 (2016)
(“The professional relationship is typically characterized by an asymmetry of
knowledge. The client seeks the professional’s advice precisely because of this
asymmetry. . . . This is not unique to the learned professions. As Kathleen
Sullivan pointed out, ‘Lawyers know far more about law than their clients, but
information asymmetry creates moral hazards (such as the incentive to lie about
the gravity of a problem) for auto mechanics as well.’” (quoting Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on
Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 580 (1998))).
11. See Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–99 (1974) (explaining that
repeat players “having done it before, have advance intelligence” as well as more
“opportunities to develop informal relationship with institutional incumbents”);
Haupt, supra note 10, at 1268 (“[E]xtensive psychological research on the part of
advertisers makes the speaker and the listener unequal. . . . Product placement,
subconscious messaging and the like give a distinct advantage to commercial
speakers over their audiences. The Court may have originally had it right in
assuming the vulnerability of consumers, though not for the consumers’ ‘lack of
sophistication,’ but for the advertisers’ overabundance of it.”).
12. See Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 62–63.
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3. Information Over Which the Law Gives the
Speaker a Monopoly
Sometimes law encourages and protects speakers’ exclusive access to information: in other words, if knowledge is power, then law sometimes makes speakers more powerful. For
example, property law affords employers and other commercial
actors with legal control over access to their property, which in
turn empowers them to control access to information about
what happens on that property. 13 They thus know more about
their workplace and manufacturing conditions than anyone
else because they have the power to exclude others from observing those conditions firsthand.
B.

Inequalities of Power

At times listeners lack power as well as (or instead of)
information. Again, the reasons for power differentials vary,
and here too these inequalities exacerbate the harms of coercion and deception that speakers can inflict upon listeners.
1. Listeners’ Vulnerability to Speakers in
Relationships of Trust
Listeners suffer from power disadvantages when they
choose to entrust speakers with sensitive information and the
authority to make important decisions. 14 Fiduciary law addresses many of these relationships of trust, dependence, and
vulnerability. 15 As Deborah DeMott explains:

13. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 39 (“In a system of property rights, there
is (I repeat) no such thing as ‘no regulation’ of speech; property rights inevitably
allow property owners to exclude prospective speakers. The question is what
forms of regulation best serve the purposes of the free speech guarantee.”).
14. See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy
Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 450 (2016) (“When trusters entrust information
about themselves, they make themselves vulnerable. Their vulnerability might include increased risk of information misuse, unauthorized disclosure,
manipulation, or loss of autonomy.”).
15. See Ethan J. Lieb & Stephen R. Galoob, Fiduciary Political Theory: A
Critique, 125 YALE L.J. 1820, 1826 (2016) (“At least three general indicia characterize fiduciary relationships: discretion, trust, and vulnerability. In relationships
exhibiting these indicia, a fiduciary is subject to specific duties—usually duties of
loyalty and care—that govern her actions on behalf of the beneficiary.”).
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Fiduciary relationships stem from or create disparities of
power and information, such that the relationship’s beneficiary is or becomes vulnerable to the actor who occupies the
fiduciary role. Such relationships require or engender trust
by the beneficiary with a correlative potential for abuse by
the fiduciary, often—but not necessarily—effected through
deceptive or disingenuous means. 16

Professionals speak to their patients and clients in these sorts
of relationships, as their listeners entrust them with confidential information and rely on their advice to make important,
often life-shaping, choices. 17 The same is often true in the
information technology context, where technology users become
vulnerable to those with whom they entrust important information or functions. 18
2. Listeners’ Vulnerability in Relationships Where
Speakers Exercise Physical, Economic, or Legal
Control
Even absent any relationship of trust, listeners become
vulnerable to speakers when those speakers exert physical,
legal, or economic control over them. The sorts of listeners
subject to speakers’ dominion in these ways include those in
16. Deborah A. DeMott, Relationships of Trust and Confidence in the
Workplace, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1255, 1259–60 (2015); see also id. at 1262 (explaining that fiduciary relationships are created when “[o]ne party, having been
invited to do so, ‘reposed’ confidence in another and reasonably relied on the
other’s superior expertise or knowledge”).
17. See Claudia Haupt, Licensing Knowledge, 72 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3151985 [https://perma.cc/
YM9J-LZ3T] (explaining that not all fiduciaries are professionals and not all professionals are fiduciaries because the professional duty not to give bad advice is
conceptually distinct from the fiduciary duty not to betray trust, even if the two
duties sometimes overlap).
18. See Balkin, supra note 5, at 1186–87 (“Because of their special power over
others and their special relationships to others, information fiduciaries have
special duties to act in ways that do not harm the interests of the people whose
information they collect, analyze, use, and distribute. . . . My goal, in other words,
is to shift the focus of the First Amendment arguments about privacy from the
kind of information to the kinds of relationships—relationships of trust and
confidence—that governments may regulate in the interests of privacy.”); James
Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 894 (2014) (“The
alternative [to thinking about search engines as editors or conduits of speech] is
listener-oriented: we could try to empower users to identify for themselves the
speech they wish to hear.”).
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government custody,19 patients in certain health care
settings, 20 and many workers. 21 Listeners in these settings are
less likely—and sometimes entirely unable—to question, rebut,
or escape powerful speakers. 22
In short, listeners sometimes have less access to key information than do speakers, sometimes listeners have less opportunity to resist or avoid speakers due to unequal power, and
sometimes both are true.
II. PROTECTING LISTENERS IN RELATIONSHIPS OF INEQUALITY
When we adopt a listener-centered approach to certain free
speech conflicts, we seek to prevent speakers from deceiving or
coercing their less powerful listeners. Sometimes we do so by
interpreting the First Amendment to permit government to
regulate comparatively knowledgeable or powerful speakers.
And sometimes we do so by protecting speech that is valuable
to vulnerable listeners from the government’s interference. As
we shall see, the government, like other powerful speakers, 23
19. See Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND.
L.J. 73, 92–93 (2015) (describing the power imbalances at work when law
enforcement officials speak to those in government custody).
20. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (“While
targeted picketing of the home threatens the psychological well-being of the
‘captive’ resident, targeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the
psychological but the physical, well-being of the patient held ‘captive’ by medical
circumstance.”).
21. See Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 64–67
(explaining that employers control workers’ economic livelihood, which in turn
also permits employers to control workers’ expression in significant ways and
even to compel workers’ attendance at “captive audience” meetings); see also
Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819
(2017) (urging that employers should be considered their workers’ fiduciaries
because of their power advantages).
22. A speaker’s physical, legal, or economic power over a listener often
enables it to limit that listener’s voice (that is, her ability to engage in
counterspeech) as well as exit (that is, her meaningful ability to walk away from
the relationship and enter into another one at least as satisfactory). See ALBERT
HIRSCHMANN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 30 (1970) (“Voice is here defined as any
attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of
affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management
directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of
forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests,
including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion.”).
23. See NEUBORNE, supra note 7, at 105 (“[P]ulling the government speech
regulator completely out of the game does not mean that the flow of speech will
become unregulated. If government is disabled from doing the job, someone else

NORTON_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

3/1/2019 10:10 AM

POWERFUL SPEAKERS AND THEIR LISTENERS

451

can endanger listeners’ First Amendment interests: the government is both a potential regulator of others’ speech and a
knowledgeable and powerful speaker itself. 24
A.

Some Doctrinal Possibilities

How can law protect listeners’ interests consistent with the
First Amendment? 25 Consider the following possibilities:
1. Permitting the Government to Prohibit Powerful
Speakers’ Lies or Misrepresentations
Lies generally advance the speaker’s (that is, the liar’s)
autonomy interests in saying what she wants to say at the
expense of her listeners’ interests in receiving accurate
information that enlightens their decision-making.26 A listenercentered resolution of this conflict understands the First Amendment to allow the government to impose higher expectations of
honesty (no deliberate falsehoods) and even accuracy (no negligent falsehoods, or perhaps even strict liability for falsehoods of
will direct the speech traffic . . .—probably one or more powerful private speakers
or conduits.”).
24. See Helen Norton, The Government’s Manufacture of Doubt, 16 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 342 (2018) (describing various ways in which the government
may frustrate listeners’ interests through its own expressive choices).
25. See Neuborne, supra note 3, at 27 (“Nonetheless, the fact is that a significant difference in substantive doctrine will, and should, exist between speakerdominated first amendment settings and hearer-dominated ones.”); id. at 29
(“Although a healthy skepticism should surround any attempt by the government
to assess the value of speech, the process of measuring instrumental value is less
openly subjective than the selective apportionment of toleration that takes place
in a speaker-centered setting. Accordingly, so long as the government censor’s
persuasion burden is significant and so long as the government is utterly disabled
from the kinds of self-interested censorship that are banned in speaker-centered
settings, a government regulator in a hearer-centered setting should not be
disabled from demonstrating that a given message diminishes a hearer’s capacity
for informed and autonomous choice and is, therefore, unprotected.”).
26. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 8, at 177 (“[T]he effect of lies, half-truths, and
failure to update information is to make the ignorant party think that she has the
information and stop looking any further. Because she stops looking, the true
information is effectively out of reach.”); WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 211 (“The
falsification or suppression of information is an important limitation of liberty in
itself and impedes the exercise of liberty in many areas.”). To be sure, the
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment sometimes protects lies from
government regulation; this is especially the case where the Court perceives the
lies to inflict little, if any, harm to listeners. See United States v. Alvarez, 567
U.S. 709, 718–22 (2012) (plurality opinion); id. at 734–36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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any kind). 27 In other words, law sometimes requires speakers
to tell the truth when they choose to speak on certain topics
even if they would prefer to dissemble. For instance, law
generally requires commercial actors to speak accurately when
they extol their products’ attributes to consumers, 28 professionals to accurately describe the risks of their recommended
course of action to their patients and clients, 29 and a corporation’s leaders to portray its economic situation truthfully
when communicating with shareholders. 30
2. Permitting the Government to Require Powerful
Speakers to Make Truthful Disclosures
Powerful speakers’ nondisclosures also threaten listeners’
interests while enhancing their own. Scheppele describes the
dangers that these nondisclosures, or secrets, pose to
vulnerable listeners’ autonomy:
Secrecy enables people to control others. To get another person to do one’s will when that other person does not want to
do so, one either can persuade the person with arguments or
use physical coercion to force the person to do what one
wants. But one may also hide the information that the other
person would find relevant to making a decision, information that would make the decision turn out differently.
This is another, powerful invisible way of exercising control:
by altering the appearance of a choice that the affected

See SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY,
LAW 132 (2014) (“Regulating lies by experts about the contents of their
actual, certified, or claimed expertise . . . attaches to a feature of the speaker and
the relationship between the speaker and the utterance. This relationship is
singled out as meriting regulation for content-independent reasons, namely that
listeners should be able to rely upon the sincerity of experts because they have or
claim special access to information that listeners either do not have, or reasonably
should not be expected to cultivate on their own.”); Norton, Truth and Lies in the
Workplace, supra note 3, at 76–84 (describing how the lies of powerful speakers
threaten especially grave harm to their listeners).
28. See infra notes 50–58and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 59–68and accompanying text.
30. E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2018) (prohibiting materially false or misleading statements or omissions and requiring certain affirmative disclosures related
to proxy elections).
27.

AND THE
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person has to make, one can often effectively determine the
outcome. 31

For this reason, more information—so long as it’s accurate
and material—is often better for listeners. 32 A listenercentered approach thus understands the First Amendment to
permit the government to require comparatively knowledgeable
and powerful speakers to make accurate disclosures about
certain matters, even if those speakers resist their discussion. 33
Illustrations include governmental requirements that
commercial speakers affirmatively disclose the health or safety
dangers posed by their products. As I’ve written in earlier
work:
This approach supports requirements that comparatively
knowledgeable and powerful speakers make truthful disclosures not only of important information to which they have
unique (and perhaps exclusive) access, but also important
information that the speakers are in the best position to
communicate even though they might otherwise be loath to
disclose for self-interested reasons. Think, for instance, of
requirements that cigarette manufacturers post government
health warnings on cigarette packages and advertisements
where smokers are most likely to see them, as tobacco manufacturers are uniquely well positioned to disseminate this
important message—but unlikely to do so voluntarily. 34

31. SCHEPPELE, supra note 8, at 304; see also id. at 5 (“[S]ecrets are also used
as tools of power, wrenching advantage from the unknowing actions of others.
What we don’t know often does hurt us—and serves to benefit others who kept us
in the dark. Secrets provide the unobservable weapons of the devious. So while
secrets enable the social world to be partitioned and individualized, making the
expression of individual autonomy in the construction of the social world possible,
they also serve as staging grounds for the deployment of power, assaults on the
very autonomy that they constitute.”).
32. Often, but not always. See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150–52 (2d Cir.
1993) (discussing New York’s “superior knowledge” rule that requires sellers to
make affirmative disclosures of fact to less knowledgeable buyers in certain
circumstances).
34. Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 69; see also
Charlotte S. Alexander, Workplace Information-Forcing: Constitutionality and
Effectiveness, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 487, 527 (2016) (“Workplace information-forcing
rules may rightly target the employer because of this superior access to
information. It is more efficient for the employer to transfer its knowledge to the
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In other words, a listener-centered approach takes a functional perspective to serving listeners’ interests by emphasizing
the effective and timely delivery of accurate information to enlighten, but not coerce, listeners’ decision-making.
3. Permitting the Government to Prevent Powerful
Speakers from Coercing Listeners, and Preventing
the Government from Coercing Listeners Itself
But more speech is not always better for listeners who lack
power. 35 Speech that is neither false nor misleading can still
frustrate listeners’ First Amendment interests when it is coercive, as can be the case where speakers have the legal,
physical, or economic power to punish their listeners’ resistance. Coercive speech also takes place in “captive audience”
environments where listeners have limited opportunity to
rebut or escape speakers, as well as in certain relationships
where speakers abuse their listeners’ trust. 36 And sometimes
the government threatens listeners’ interests by forcing them
to listen to comparatively powerful speakers, speakers that can
include the government itself.
In these environments, a listener-centered approach protects vulnerable listeners from coercion by restricting how,
worker, or to be the conduit for the government’s provision of knowledge, than for
the less informed party to expend the resources in an attempt to inform him- or
herself.”).
35. See Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American
Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 206–07 (2017) (explaining that cheap
and plentiful speech sometimes poses new dangers to some listeners and to the
public more broadly); Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? (Columbia
University Public Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 14-573 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096337
[https://perma.cc/VG4T-2X6N] (“The unfortunate truth is that cheap speech may
be used to attack, harass, and silence as much as it is used to illuminate or
debate.”).
36. As Caroline Mala Corbin has observed, listeners are “captive” if they
cannot readily avoid the message and if they should not have to abandon the
space to avoid the message. Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right
Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 943–50 (2009) (identifying the
home, public transportation, medical facilities, churches, funerals, and polling
places as locations where audiences may be considered as captive); see also J.M.
Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2310–12
(1999) (“Generally speaking, people are captive audiences for First Amendment
purposes when they are unavoidably and unfairly coerced into listening. . . .
Captivity in this sense is a matter of practicality rather than necessity. It is about
the right not to have to flee rather than the inability to flee.”).
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when, or where powerful speakers may address them. For
instance, a listener-centered approach permits the government
to forbid speakers from coercing listeners’ choices through
threats, such as an employer’s threats of job loss or retaliation
if workers assert their legal right to unionize. 37 A listenercentered approach also understands the First Amendment to
allow the government to restrict speech that extracts listeners’
assent through intimidation or exhaustion. 38 Along these lines,
the Supreme Court upheld a governmental ban on attorneys’
in-person solicitation of potential clients, concluding that such
expression threatened greater dangers of coercion than other
types of attorney advertising: “[I]n-person solicitation may
exert pressure and often demands an immediate response,
without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection.” 39
Finally, a listener-centered approach interprets the First
Amendment to bar the government itself from coercing less
powerful listeners. Although decided on due process rather
than free speech grounds, the Supreme Court’s canonical
decision in Miranda v. Arizona exemplifies a listener-centered
approach, recognizing listeners’ vulnerability at the hands of a
speaker who exerts physical and legal control over them. The
Court thus required powerful speakers (governmental law
enforcement officials) to affirmatively disclose available constitutional protections like the right to remain silent and the right
to counsel; it did so to protect vulnerable listeners (the subjects
of custodial interrogation) from deception and coercion. After
emphasizing the listeners’ isolation and desperation, the Court
concluded:

37. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618
(1969) (emphasizing workers’ economic dependence on their employers when
explaining that an employer’s threat of retaliation against workers was “without
the protection of the First Amendment”).
38. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455–56 (1966) (“[T]he very fact of
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the
weakness of individuals . . . .”); id. at 465 (“The entire thrust of police
interrogation there, as in all the cases today, was to put the defendant in such an
emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment. The abdication of
the constitutional privilege—the choice on his part to speak to the police—was not
made knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of his rights;
the compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation, and not an
independent decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak.”).
39. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978).
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[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to
combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the
accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his
rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully
honored. . . . For those unaware of the privilege, the
warning is needed simply to make them aware of it—the
threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its
exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the
interrogation atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or
woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator’s
imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the
interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or
that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and
will bode ill when presented to a jury. 40

To be sure, the custodial interrogation setting offers an
extreme example of captive listeners; less extreme illustrations
include certain educational, employment, or health care settings. For instance, the Court has held that the government’s
prayer or other religious speech to kids as listeners in public
schools can coerce students’ religious beliefs or practices in
violation of the Establishment Clause—recognizing, as in
Miranda, that psychological pressure can sometimes coerce
vulnerable listeners as effectively as physical threats. 41 For
this reason, courts have held that in certain circumstances the
Constitution constrains the government’s speech to protect its
listeners from coercion; 42 for related reasons courts have also
held that the First Amendment sometimes—permits the gov-

40. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68.
41. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (“This pressure, though
subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”).
42. See Norton, supra note 19, at 92–96 (discussing how law enforcement
officers’ lies to those in government custody are sometimes sufficiently coercive to
violate the Due Process Clause).
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ernment to regulate other powerful speakers to protect vulnerable listeners from coercion. 43
*

*

*

These approaches permit the government to restrain
knowledgeable and powerful speakers’ efforts to lie, hide, or
coerce. Even so, a listener-centered perspective still leaves those
speakers with the liberty to make a wide range of expressive
choices: it does not force speakers to mouth opinions that they
don’t hold, nor does it prohibit them from sharing their opinions or additional accurate information of their choosing in
noncoercive settings.
B.

Listener-Centered Relationships: Examples and
Applications

What does a listener-centered approach to First Amendment doctrine look like in practice? First, as I’ve explained elsewhere, a listener-centered focus can inform our choice of the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to the government’s
decision to regulate comparatively knowledgeable or powerful
speakers for listeners’ benefit. 44 Courts can thus choose to
defer, and apply rational-basis scrutiny, to the government’s
listener-based regulatory choices. This is the case, as we’ll see,
with the Court’s application of rational-basis review to the
government’s compelled disclosures in the commercial speech
setting. 45
Second, even if courts instead apply heightened scrutiny to
the government’s regulatory choices, a listener-centered focus
can inform their determination whether the government’s
action survives that scrutiny. In other words, the government’s
regulatory choices that inform and empower comparatively
vulnerable listeners can satisfy not only rational-basis scrutiny
but sometimes also intermediate or even more suspicious scrutiny. 46 Examples here include the government’s restrictions on
43. See infra notes 50–68and accompanying text.
44. Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 68.
45. See infra notes 53–54and accompanying text.
46. See Amicus Brief of American Medical Association in support of
Respondents, Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, No. 16-1140,
2018 WL 1156609 (urging that strict scrutiny be applied to all regulation of
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professional speech that survive intermediate scrutiny when
they serve listeners’ interests. 47 (Even in the campaign finance
setting—which involves the regulation of speech in public discourse—the Court has applied exacting scrutiny to uphold laws
that require political speakers and contributors to disclose
themselves as the source of campaign contributions and communications; it upheld these laws precisely because those
disclosures serve listeners’ interests in knowing an expression’s
source as a measure of its credibility. 48 Similarly, the Court
has held that the government’s regulation of campaign speech
within one-hundred feet of polling places survives even strict
scrutiny, finding it narrowly tailored to protect listeners—
there, voters—from coercion. 49)
Consider the following possible listener-centered relationships; as we’ll see, some reflect current doctrine, while others
would require changes to that doctrine.
1. Commercial Actors’ Speech to Consumers
The Supreme Court’s traditional commercial speech doctrine long exemplified a listener-centered approach. 50 In a
professional speech, but concluding that informed consent requirements survive
such scrutiny, as well as the California law under challenge in Becerra).
47. E.g., King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding
state law that prohibited licensed counselors from engaging in sexual orientation
conversion efforts therapy with clients under age eighteen).
48. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010) (applying, and upholding, campaign disclosure requirements under “exacting” scrutiny
in which the regulation must be substantially related to an important government
interest); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (same).
49. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion).
50. Here I focus on the Court’s “modern” commercial speech doctrine that
emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. As many commentators have observed, however,
in recent years the Court has departed from its earlier more listener-centered approach to commercial speech. See NEUBORNE, supra note 7, at 104–05 (“Modern
free speech law rests on a slippery slope so precipitous that any step toward government speech regulation aimed at controlling dysfunctional speakers,
improving the quality of choices for hearers, or reinforcing the Kantian dignity of
hearers and speech targets is demonized by the Supreme Court as a first step
toward tyranny.”); Wendy E. Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free Speech and Public
Health: Unraveling the Commercial-Professional Speech Paradox, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
887, 890 (2017) (explaining how, in recent years, “the Court has given less weight
to the interests of listeners, including their health interests”); Morgan N. Weiland,
Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian
Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1395 (2017) (explaining that under the
Court’s more recent application of commercial speech doctrine, “listeners’ rights
are subordinated to corporate speech rights. It is deeply ambiguous whether the
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setting where commercial actors possess much more information about their goods and services than do their consumers, the Court interprets the First Amendment to permit the
government to regulate speech that frustrates listeners’
interests while protecting speech that serves them.
The Court treats commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to illegal activity (like advertisements for illegal
drugs) as entirely unprotected by the First Amendment
because listeners (that is, consumers) have no constitutionally
protected interest in receiving that information. 51 For this
reason, the Court has long interpreted the First Amendment to
permit the government to prohibit commercial actors’ lies and
misrepresentations about their products’ health-and-safety
risks and many other matters.52 For the same reason, the
Court has applied deferential rational-basis review to
governmental requirements that commercial speakers make
truthful disclosures about those matters: 53 as an example,
recall the federal statute requiring cigarette manufacturers to
publish the Surgeon General’s warning prominently on their
advertisements and packages.54
At the same time, the Court generally protects truthful
and non-misleading commercial speech from government regulation because that expression often provides great value to
consumers’ decision-making. 55 For this reason, the Court has
applied intermediate scrutiny to strike down laws prohibiting
sellers from publishing accurate information about legal products or services, information that includes the price of pres-

Court’s deregulatory holdings actually benefit listeners, though corporate
interests are always served”).
51. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 562–64 (1980).
52. E.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (“[T]he State may ban
commercial expression that is fraudulent or deceptive without further justification.”).
53. E.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(applying rational-basis test to uphold commercial disclosure requirements that
serve consumers’ interests as listeners).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2012).
55. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–64.

NORTON_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

460

3/1/2019 10:10 AM

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

cription drugs, 56 the amount of alcohol in beer, 57 and the
availability of attorneys’ services. 58
2. Professionals’ Speech to Patients and Clients
Professional speakers like doctors and lawyers enjoy advantages of both information and power over their patients and
clients who rely on their recommendations when making important life decisions. As Claudia Haupt explains, professional
speech involves individualized advice to a client or patient “tied
to a body of disciplinary knowledge from which it gains authority within a social relationship that is defined by
knowledge asymmetry[,] . . . reliance[,] . . . and trust . . . .”59
Patients and clients thus seek accurate information from their
health care providers, lawyers, accountants, and other professional experts about the risks and benefits of a proposed
course of treatment or action that informs, but does not coerce,
their decision about whether to undertake that course of
conduct. Think, for example, of a patient considering the pros
and cons of more and less invasive treatment regimens, or a
client trying to decide whether to settle for pennies on the
dollar rather than risk continued litigation. Law sometimes
protects these listeners’ interests by protecting speech consistent with professional standards from the government’s efforts
to bend patients’ and clients’ choices in the government’s
preferred direction, and sometimes by regulating the quality of
professional speech to ensure its trustworthiness (and thus its
value to listeners) through licensing regimes, professional
responsibility requirements, and malpractice liability. 60
Although the Supreme Court has yet to settle on its First
Amendment approach to professional speech, 61 many lower
56. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
763 (1976).
57. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1995).
58. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
59. Haupt, supra note 17, at 26; see also id. (“The client, in short, depends on
a distinction between good and bad professional advice—a distinction that a strict
regime of content- and viewpoint-neutrality would obliterate.”).
60. Id. (“But this presumption of speaker equality does not apply outside of
public discourse where we continue to value facts and truth. One such area is professional speech. . . . [L]istener interests are vitally important to professional
speech where the very purpose of the professional-client relationship is to give
accurate, comprehensive and reliable advice to the client.”).
61. See Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,

NORTON_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

3/1/2019 10:10 AM

POWERFUL SPEAKERS AND THEIR LISTENERS

461

courts to date have applied this sort of listener-centered approach to free speech problems in this setting.
More specifically, we support listeners’ interests in receiving quality professional advice when we interpret the First
Amendment to protect lawyers’ and doctors’ speech from governmental restrictions that are inconsistent with professional
standards. Governmental restraints along these lines include
the federal regulation that forbade federally funded legal services lawyers from representing clients challenging welfare
laws even though professional standards generally require
lawyers to vigorously pursue their clients’ plausible claims. 62
Or the Florida law that banned doctors’ discussions of gun
safety with their patients even when professional standards
encourage such conversations to prevent accidental injuries. 63
At the same time, we also promote listeners’ interests in
receiving quality professional advice when we understand the
First Amendment to permit the government to regulate professionals’ speech to ensure its consistency with the relevant body
of professional knowledge. Law has long done so through
licensing requirements that require demonstrated proficiency
with the profession’s skills and standards before one can offer
professional advice, as well as through the imposition of
malpractice liability when professionals dispense advice that
deviates from the discipline’s norms. 64 Relatedly, professional
ethics rules extensively regulate lawyers’ speech to protect
clients’ interests, sometimes by prohibiting speech dangerous
to listeners and sometimes by requiring affirmative disclosures
of value to listeners. Consider, for example, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct that require lawyers to disclose potential

2367 (2018) (“In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a
persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is
exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles. We do not foreclose the
possibility that some such reason exists. We need not do so because the licensed
notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny.”). For additional discussion, see
infra notes 76–88 and accompanying text.
62. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (striking down a
governmental regulation forbidding attorneys employed by the Legal Services
Corporation from representing clients in challenges to existing welfare law).
63. See Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (striking down state law that forbade doctors from asking patients
about gun ownership).
64. See Haupt, supra note 17 (describing the government’s ex ante and ex post
regulation of professional speech through licensing and malpractice liability).
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conflicts of interest, 65 that prohibit lawyers from knowingly
making false statements of material fact or law, 66 that regulate
lawyers’ speech when describing their experience and practice
areas,67 and that regulate lawyers’ descriptions of themselves
and their firms. 68
3. Employers’ Speech to Workers
The workplace features a communicative relationship in
which employers enjoy advantages of both information and
power over workers as listeners. As I’ve written elsewhere:
[T]he employment relationship is riddled with information
asymmetries: employers know considerably more than
workers about the terms and conditions of employment,
about current and future industry and economic projections,
and—as repeat players with greater resources—about
available legal protections. Moreover, workers also experience significant power disadvantage, as employers control
over workers’ economic livelihood also permits them to
control workers’ expression and sometimes even their
physical liberty (e.g., by compelling workers’ attendance at
“captive audience” meetings). 69

The employment relationship is thus one that justifies the
choice to privilege workers’ First Amendment interests when
they conflict with employers’.
And conflict they often do. For instance, workers want
employers to speak truthfully about their job security and prospects for advancement, while employers sometimes seek to
obfuscate.70 Some employers insist that workers listen to antiunion speech at the workplace, while many workers resist such
65. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4, 1.7, and 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2002).
66. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
69. Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 37–38.
70. See Richard P. Perna, Deceitful Employers: Common Law Fraud as a
Mechanism to Remedy Intentional Employer Misrepresentation in Hiring, 41
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 233, 234–38 (2005) (describing examples of workers’ detrimental “reliance on false statements or promises the employer made during prehiring negotiations”).
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“captive audience” meetings in which employers compel not
only workers’ attendance but also sometimes their silence by
threatening their jobs or by punishing their counterspeech. 71
And workers have a significant interest in receiving information about their legal rights in the workplace, while some
employers would prefer not to disclose that information. A
listener-centered approach to the employment relationship
resolves these conflicts by enabling the government to prohibit
employers’ lies and misrepresentations about the terms and
conditions of employment, to forbid employers from requiring
workers to attend captive audience meetings on the perceived
dangers of unionization, and to require employers to disclose
accurate information about available legal protections.
Applying a listener-centered approach in the employment
setting would generate different results in a number of ongoing
legal and policy disputes. For instance, a listener-centered approach would encourage the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) to rethink its longstanding unwillingness to regulate
employers’ lies and misrepresentations, and to prohibit employers’ captive audience meetings, in union representation elections. 72 In listener-centered relationships, listeners’ interests in
the truth outweigh speakers’ interests in shading it, while listeners’ interests in avoiding unwelcome speech trump speakers’
interests in addressing listeners in coercive environments.
For the same reasons, a listener-centered approach explains why the D.C. Circuit was wrong to strike down, as
71. See Paul M. Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace
Meetings in the Post-Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17, 19–
22 (2010); see also id. at 39–43 (“Private-sector employers in the United States
routinely hold mandatory workplace meetings during union organization
campaigns to express antiunion views to their employees. Such captive audience
speech occurs when employers require supervisors to convey management’s antiunion opinions to their subordinates or when employers require employees to
listen to the employer’s anti-union message at mandatory meetings during work
time. In conversation with supervisors, employees risk being fired for
insubordination if they refuse to listen to partisan advocacy; in the case of larger
group meetings, employees may be terminated for refusing to attend anti-union
assemblies. Indeed, employees can be lawfully terminated for merely asking
questions of their employers during such a meeting or for leaving such meetings
without permission. . . . [A] recent study indicated that employees were subject to
nearly eleven captive audience meetings during an average union campaign.”
(citations omitted)).
72. See Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 42–43
(describing the NLRB’s reluctance to regulate lies and misrepresentations in
union representation elections).
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infringing on employers’ protected speech, the NLRB’s requirement that employers post notice of workers’ National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) rights. 73 Many workers would benefit
from knowing that the National Labor Relations Act prohibits
employers from punishing their concerted efforts to improve
their pay or working conditions even in nonunionized workplaces. 74 That the NLRA does so, however, remains a secret to
most workers. 75 Again, in listener-centered relationships, listeners’ desires that speakers reveal accurate and material information prevails over speakers’ interests in keeping that
information to themselves.
4. Service Providers’ Speech to Women Seeking
Reproductive Health Care
A listener-centered approach would also have generated a
very different outcome in National Institute for Family and Life

73. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. NLRB, 717 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2013), overruled in
part on other grounds by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C.
Cir. 2014). The D.C. Circuit struck down the NLRB’s notice-posting requirement
even though many other employment statutes have long—and until recently,
uncontroversially—required employers to post similar notices of workers’ legal
rights. See Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 68–76.
74. E.g., Custom Cut, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. No. 17 (2003) (NLRB decision
concluding that employer violated NLRA by retaliating against workers who
discussed their pay with other employees); NLRB, Protected Concerted Activity:
West Caldwell, New Jersey, https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/protectedconcerted-activity/west-caldwell-new-jersey [http://perma.cc/WK7W-ACPM] (discussing NLRB regional office decision for Cheese Processing Company, Case No.
22-CA-061632 (2011), concluding that employer violated NLRA when it prohibited
workers from discussing their pay with each other).
75. See, e.g., Peter D. DeChiara, The Right to Know: An Argument for
Informing Employees of Their Rights Under the National Labor Relations Act, 32
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 431, 433–34 (1995) (“In the non-union setting, employees’
ignorance leads to the underutilization of legitimate workplace protests, of the
voicing of group grievances, and of requests for outside help from government
agencies or other third parties. In sum, lack of notice of their rights disempowers
employees.”). Workers’ lack of knowledge about their legal rights is by no means
limited to the National Labor Relations Act. See Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi
Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND.
L.J. 1069, 1093–95 (2014) (finding that fifty-nine percent of workers surveyed had
inaccurate substantive knowledge of their rights under wage and hour law and
seventy-seven percent had inaccurate procedural legal knowledge—that is, they
did not know where to file a wage and hour complaint). Alexander and Prasad
further found that “the least politically, economically, and socially powerful and
secure workers were the least likely to have accurate substantive and procedural
legal knowledge.” Id. at 1098–99.
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Advocates v. Becerra. 76 There, a 5-4 Supreme Court preliminarily enjoined a California law that required crisis pregnancy
centers to accurately describe available medical services when
speaking to the pregnant women they seek to influence.
Indeed, the Court’s decision in Becerra makes plain both the
tensions between speakers’ and listeners’ First Amendment
interests in the reproductive health-care setting, and the very
different results that follow the choice to privilege speakers’ as
opposed to listeners’ interests in that expressive relationship.
California, like a number of other states and localities,
required facilities that seek to serve pregnant women to
disclose certain information to those women. First, it required
those health care facilities licensed under state law to provide
women with the government’s notice that “California has
public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access
to comprehensive family planning services (including all FDAapproved methods of contraception), prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify,
contact the county social service office at [insert phone number
here].” 77 Second, the state required unlicensed facilities to provide the government’s notice that “[t]his facility is not licensed
as a medical facility by the State of California and has no
licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises
the provision of services.” 78
Crisis pregnancy centers then brought a First Amendment
challenge to California’s law. These centers are generally affiliated with or operated by organizations opposing abortion and
offer a limited range of free services to pregnant women.79
Most, if not all, of these centers do not offer referrals or any
other services related to birth control or abortion, and many
have no professional health care providers on staff. 80
Imagine that you are pregnant. You may know that you
don’t want an abortion. You may know that you do. You may be
unsure. If you’re like many (if not most), you want accurate information about available options and services before deciding
your next step. You don’t want to be lied to, you don’t want
76. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (West 2016), preliminarily
enjoined by Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
78. Id. § 123472(b)(1), preliminarily enjoined by Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361.
79. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2368.
80. Id.
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relevant information withheld from you, and you don’t want to
be bullied. Further, you want that information sooner rather
than later, as delays create new health risks, limiting (and
sometimes foreclosing altogether) some of your choices. When
we take women’s interests as listeners seriously, then we
understand the First Amendment to permit the government to
require service providers to make truthful disclosures to the
women whose choices they seek to shape. In other words, the
reproductive health care setting justifies a listener-centered
approach because it features inequalities of information: service providers as speakers know more than their listeners
about the services they do and don’t provide.
The Becerra majority, however, ignored what women as
listeners would find helpful in making key (and constitutionally
protected) decisions about their health and lives. Focusing instead on the centers as speakers and what they do and don’t
want to say to the pregnant women they seek to influence, the
Court failed to protect listeners’ autonomy, enlightenment, and
self-governance interests—values at the heart of the Free
Speech Clause.
For example, after characterizing the California law as a
content-based regulation of the centers’ speech, 81 the majority
then asserted that “this Court has not recognized ‘professional
speech’ as a separate category of speech,” and instead described
its precedent as affording “less protection for professional
speech in two circumstances—neither of which turned on the
fact that professionals were speaking.” 82 These circumstances,
according to the majority, involved the Court’s application of
rational-basis review to “some laws that require professionals
to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial speech’” as well as its affirmation of the government’s
ability to “regulate professional conduct, even if that conduct
incidentally involves speech.” 83 After describing its past deferential review of the government’s compelled disclosures as
81. The majority opinion did not discuss the fact that in certain settings the
Court’s past precedent had indicated less suspicion of, and more deference to,
governmental disclosure requirements that result in more speech than government regulations that restrict, and thus reduce the amount of, available speech.
E.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(upholding commercial disclosure requirements as serving consumers’ interests as
listeners).
82. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72.
83. Id. at 2372.
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applying only to purely “factual and uncontroversial” disclosures about the services that the speaker itself provides, 84 the
majority then distinguished California’s compelled disclosures
as concerning the inherently controversial subject of abortion,
and as directed to services that others (rather than the centers
themselves) provide. 85
But again, a listener-centered approach would ask instead
what information would serve reasonable listeners’ interests,
privileging those listeners’ interests when in conflict with the
speaker’s. Pregnant women considering their next steps are
generally interested in accurate information about relevant
services that can help them regardless of who provides those
services. 86 Relatedly, a listener-centered approach appropriately understands the Supreme Court’s precedent that calls for
deferential review of the government’s compelled disclosure
only of “purely factual and uncontroversial” information to
mean “factually uncontroversial” or, more accurately, “factually
uncontroverted” information. 87 That California offers low-cost,
sometimes free, medical services that include prenatal care,
birth control, and abortion is an objectively verifiable, empirically uncontroverted fact. So too that unlicensed pregnancy
crisis centers have no licensed medical providers on site. That
some speakers would prefer not to talk about those facts—or
would prefer that their listeners never learn of them—does not
make them “factually controversial.” As I’ve written elsewhere:
[U]nder the challengers’ view, a disclosure is impermissibly
“controversial” for First Amendment purposes when one
party does not want the matter discussed in a particular

84. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
85. Id.
86. Common practice undermines the Becerra majority’s claim that the
Court’s past precedent applying rational-basis review to the government’s
compelled disclosures applies only to disclosures about the speaker’s “own
services.” For example, some states require that health care professionals disclose
accurate and material information about lawful treatment options even if they do
not provide those services themselves. Examples include state and federal laws
that require certain health care providers and facilities to inform patients or
residents of their rights to execute advance health care directives, request
palliative care, refuse potentially life-prolonging treatment, or (in jurisdictions
where lawful) to end one’s suffering with the aid of a physician. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §
1395cc(f)(1) (2000); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1569.156(a)(3) (West 2018).
87. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (upholding commercial disclosure requirements as serving consumers’ interests as listeners).
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way, or at all. Such an approach, however, would enable
challengers to defeat listeners’ substantial informational
interests simply by manufacturing controversy over what is
accurate information. For example, such an approach would
potentially treat the Surgeon General’s requirement that
cigarette manufacturers display warnings about the
dangers of tobacco as impermissibly one-sided and thus
“controversial” in that it fails to note that smoking brings
many people great pleasure and that some smokers live long
and healthy lives. An approach more consistent with the
protection of listeners’ First Amendment interests would
thus understand “factual and uncontroversial” in this
context to refer to assertions that are provable (or disprovable) as a factual matter in the same way required of
contested assertions in defamation, perjury, and antifraud
law. . . . In other words, here “uncontroversial” should mean
factually or empirically uncontroversial rather than politically uncontested. 88

III. HARD QUESTIONS AND TOUGH CHOICES
By proposing that listeners’ interests should carry the day
when they conflict with speakers’ in certain expressive relationships of inequality, a listener-centered approach makes
some hard First Amendment problems easier. At the same
time, however, a listener-centered approach generates some
difficult questions of its own.
A.

Identifying Limiting Principles

Of course, speakers enjoy advantages of information and
power over their listeners in a wide variety of relationships.
Should we take the side of listeners in all of them?
Consider the four sets of relationships described in Part II:
commercial, professional, employment, and reproductive health
care. All involve offers or exchanges outside of public discourse
in which speakers enjoy advantages of information or power (or
both) over their listeners. In each of them, the speaker seeks to
shape his listeners’ choices in his preferred direction: to persuade them to buy what he’s selling; to settle rather than sue
88.

Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra note 3, at 74–75.
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or to wait rather than operate (or vice versa); to take, keep, or
leave a job; or to continue a pregnancy. All involve the
speaker’s delivery of information that is objectively verifiable:
the attributes of a particular product, the professional consensus about a course of medical treatment or legal action, the
terms and conditions of employment or the availability of legal
protections in the workplace, and the existence and extent of
available reproductive health care services. And all involve
listeners who are making decisions (often life-shaping decisions) about their property or persons. 89
But we can readily think of a number of other expressive
relationships that involve informational and power inequalities
yet where we may worry about the First Amendment implications of protecting listeners’ interests at the expense of speakers’. (Again, I put aside for now speech that occurs in traditional public discourse, like campaign and other political
speech.) 90 Consider, for instance, the speech of family, friends,
or intimate partners to and among each other in relationships
of trust, and sometimes vulnerability. 91 For a variety of
reasons, some may be reluctant to privilege listeners’ First
Amendment interests in these settings by prohibiting lies, by
requiring certain disclosures, or by prohibiting potentially coercive speech. Some may hope for, and thus prefer to presume,
equality between these speakers and listeners even if that is
not always the case. Relatedly, some may think that listeners
in these relationships are unlikely to suffer significant harm, or
may think that they can protect their own interests through
skepticism or counterspeech. Some may fear that the

89. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71
OKLA. L. REV. 59, 75–77 (2018) (explaining that because a traditional function of
government is to protect us from harm to our persons and property, the
government may have greater First Amendment leeway to regulate speech that
threatens such harm).
90. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.
91. See Ethan Lieb, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 732
(2009) (“The fiduciary concept recognized by our law is a flexible one. I have
argued here that it is flexible enough to encompass enforcement of certain duties
of friendship that we all know well from our moral lives. Friendship—of a certain
sort, to be sure—is undoubtedly a relationship of trust and vulnerability, and
fiduciary law is set up specifically to give effect to and frame this sort of special
relationship. . . . Nothing I have argued for here suggests that all friends qualify
for fiduciary treatment; rather, courts must not fear that there is some category
mistake being made by those claiming fiduciary duties from their friends or
former friends.”).
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government’s regulation of speech in these settings threatens
to chill valuable expression among these parties. Some may
doubt that law is a good way to generate or maintain trust in
these relationships even if they think that law has a helpful
role to play in policing other, less intimate sorts of relationships. (Even so, note that law sometimes regulates communications among family members or intimate partners where
information or power asymmetries threaten certain specific
harms.) 92
In short, we may feel that some inequalities between
speakers and listeners are less unfair or objectionable than
others, or that the unintended consequences of addressing
some expressive inequalities are especially grave. 93 Although
our intuitions about these matters may well differ, these
intuitions, in turn, offer potential limiting principles for
identifying the universe of expressive inequalities that justify a
listener-centered approach. For instance, Jane Bambauer has
proposed (in the informational privacy context) that a speaker’s
fiduciary responsibilities should be triggered only when the
speaker has affirmatively induced a listener’s trust through its
assurances that it will not disclose or abuse listeners’ private

92. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1984) (imposing
tort liability for the defendant’s deception that led to the transmission of a
sexually transmissible disease); Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct.
App. 1983) (imposing tort liability on the defendant for knowingly
misrepresenting himself to be sterile before engaging in intercourse with the
plaintiff that resulted in her ectopic pregnancy); Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child
Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 675–76,
716–18 (2006) (explaining that law rarely regulates parents’ speech to their
children despite “[t]he speaker’s legally enforced despotism, and the captive,
immature, and vulnerable listener,” but noting an exception with respect to
speech that “undermines the child’s relationship with the other parent” in certain
child custody disputes).
93. Many of us are more interested in some types of inequalities than others,
sometimes (but not always) based on self-interest or the limits of experience.
Many Revolution-era Americans, for example, were fiercely committed to the
notion that Americans should have the same rights as Englishmen—but not at all
interested in inequalities involving race, sex, and wealth. EDMUND S. MORGAN,
BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC 1763–89, 93–94 (3d ed. 1992); see also Mary Anne
Franks, Injury Inequality, in INJURY AND INJUSTICE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF
HARM AND REDRESS 239 (Anne Bloom et al. eds., 2018) (“The selective deployment
of the First Amendment is one of the barest expressions of injury hierarchy.
Speech harms that implicate financial, business, and judicial interests are viewed
as extremely serious. Speech harms that implicate other interests, such as racial
or gender equality, are viewed as trivial.”).
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information. 94 Thinking about the hard problem of limiting
principles can help us identify which expressive inequalities we
find most troubling, and why.
B.

Determining Listeners’ Interests

Even if we agree to privilege listeners’ interests within a
certain communicative relationship, we may still disagree as to
whether we serve listeners’ interests by protecting expression
or instead by regulating it. For instance, we can imagine
debates over what sort of information listeners reasonably
want in various contexts, as some objectively verifiable facts
may strike us as more material to their decision-making than
others.
Moreover, listeners’ autonomy interests sometimes clash
with those of other listeners. Consider trolling, for instance,
which involves the deliberate online posting of outrageous or
otherwise objectionable commentary simply to provoke a reaction. 95 As I’ve discussed elsewhere, “[a]lthough the trolls’
targets find this speech of no value and often of great harm,
some number of the trolls’ listeners include other members of
the trolling community who consider trolling to be enjoyable
precisely because others find it so unpleasant.” 96 These tensions again force us to make some hard choices: when listeners’
interests conflict with each other, which listeners should come
first? In close cases, we might choose a tiebreaker that reflects
our own preferred hierarchy of First Amendment values (which
then offers additional opportunities for disagreement). For
example, those who believe that the First Amendment’s
primary purpose is to facilitate democratic self-governance may
privilege some listeners’ self-governance interests over other
listeners’ autonomy interests when the two are in conflict—as
may be the case, for example, when robot trolls deliver inflammatory falsehoods to influence election outcomes in ways that
94. See Jane Bambauer, The Relationships Between Speech and Conduct, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1941, 1951–52 (2016) (“If the state could identify and regulate
a fiduciary relationship any time one person trusted another person or firm, the
results would trouble even the most hardcore privacy advocate.”).
95. See WHITNEY PHILLIPS, THIS IS WHY WE CAN’T HAVE N ICE THINGS:
MAPPING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ONLINE TROLLING AND MAINSTREAM
CULTURE 2 (2016).
96. See Helen Norton, Robotic Speakers and Human Listeners, 41 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2018).
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deceive some listeners while delighting others. 97 Or one might
instead prefer James Grimmelmann’s suggestion that “[l]istener choices for speech trump listener choices against speech
when the two conflict.” 98 Again, we possess a variety of tools for
resolving these conflicts even though we may disagree about
which tool we prefer.
Finally, readily identifiable speaker-listener relationships
comprise only a part of the larger First Amendment web of
communicative relationships. For instance, speech sometimes
takes the form of free-flowing conversation in which characterizing some participants as listeners and others as speakers is
far from easy. 99 To be sure, the more that conditions of equality
render the exchange a true dialogue between the parties, the
less the need for a listener-centered approach in that setting.
But when some parties to the exchange suffer disadvantages of
information or power, they may be considerably less likely than
their partners to describe their experience as a conversation. A
listener-centered approach can acknowledge the diversity of expressive relationships even while counseling that we affirmatively investigate whether an environment is one of equality,
rather than simply assume that it is. 100
97. See Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J.
DEMOCRACY 63, 70 (2017) (“[B]ots can spread information or misinformation, and
can cause topics to ‘trend’ online through the automated promotion of hashtags,
stories, and the like. During the 2016 campaign, the prevalence of bots in
spreading propaganda and fake news appears to have reached new heights.”).
98. James Grimmelmann, Listeners’ Choices, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 365, 392
(2019) (“The unwilling listener in a one-to-one case can have her choice not to be
spoken to respected, while the unwilling listener in a one-to-many case will have
to put up with the unwanted speech.”).
99. See LEVY & ORR, supra note 7, at 78 (“To some extent, deliberative notions
of expression even muddy the coherence of the speaker-listener distinction, since
in the ideal deliberative forum everyone speaks and everyone listens.”).
100. For these reasons, we might best describe these relationships as reflecting
a continuum rather than try to sort them into mutually exclusive categories. See
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 14, at 458 (“But the law need not face the binary
choice of treating information relationships as either Fiduciary or Unprotected.
Surely some middle ground exists between these two extremes. . . . In
relationships where vulnerabilities are minimized because there is only a small
amount of trust, these remedies should be applied sparingly or lightly. Where
there is greater trust (or greater potential for exposures), entrustees should be
held to higher duties of care and loyalty. Rather than relying on a rigid
fiduciary/non-fiduciary distinction, we propose a more flexible approach that
recognizes the role of trust in all information relationships.”). I too want to resist
formal categories and instead look at the functional relationships between
speakers and listeners. See Norton, supra note 8, at 575 (“Efforts to articulate
employers’ legal duties of honesty and accuracy should thus be informed by a
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CONCLUSION
A listener-centered approach doesn’t solve all free speech
problems. Instead, it supplies a different and often helpful
framework for thinking about some of them. 101 When we turn
our attention from speakers to listeners, we see that listeners
in some expressive relationships suffer disadvantages of information or power that undercut their First Amendment autonomy, enlightenment, and self-governance interests.
When we adopt a listener-centered approach, we thus focus
on a different set of questions than when we frame our inquiry
around speakers’ interests. What do listeners reasonably want
from speakers in relationships of expressive inequality? Listeners generally seek accurate information that informs, but does
not coerce, their decision-making. This is the case for decisions,
among others, about whether to buy certain products or
services, whether to embark on a certain medical or legal
course of action, whether to take or leave a job or seek improved working conditions, and whether to continue or terminate a
pregnancy. The higher the stakes for the listener, the more
severe the consequences of deception and coercion. 102 When we
take listeners’ interests seriously in these relationships, we
improve the quality of the communicative discourse, and we
recognize listeners as ends in themselves—rather than as mere
means through which powerful speakers seek to achieve their
own ends.

functional, rather than formalist, understanding of the information and power
dynamics within this relationship.”).
101. See Burt Neuborne, The Status of the Hearer in Mr. Madison’s
Neighborhood, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 897, 900 (2017) (“Even if, however,
most outcomes remained the same, taking the interest of all participants in the
speech process seriously would deepen First Amendment analysis.”).
102. See Haupt, supra note 10, at 1271 (explaining that the dangers of
informational asymmetries “are exacerbated when the client’s personal health or
freedom or significant financial interests are at stake”).

